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ABSTRACT
In recent years, smart contracts have suered major exploits, cost-
ing millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts
are deployed on a blockchain. As such, they cannot be modied
once deployed. ough various tools have been proposed to detect
vulnerable smart contracts, the majority fails to protect vulnera-
ble contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain.
Only very few solutions have been proposed so far to tackle the
issue of post-deployment. However, these solutions suer from low
precision and are not generic enough to prevent any type of aack.
In this work, we introduce ÆGIS, a dynamic analysis tool that
protects smart contracts from being exploited during runtime. Its
capability of detecting new vulnerabilities can easily be extended
through so-called aack paerns. ese paerns are wrien in a
domain-specic language that is tailored to the execution model of
Ethereum smart contracts. e language enables the description of
malicious control and data ows. In addition, we propose a novel
mechanism to streamline and speed up the process of managing
aack paerns. Paerns are voted upon and stored via a smart
contract, thus leveraging the benets of tamper-resistance and
transparency provided by the blockchain. We compare ÆGIS to
current state-of-the-art tools and demonstrate that our solution
achieves higher precision in detecting aacks. Finally, we perform
a large-scale analysis on the rst 4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum
blockchain, thereby conrming the occurrences of well reported
and yet unreported aacks in the wild.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain has evolved greatly since its rst introduction in 2009 [25].
A blockchain is essentially a veriable, append-only list of records
in which all transactions are recorded in batches of so-called blocks.
Each block is linked to a previous block via a cryptographic hash.
is linked list of blocks is maintained by a decentralised peer-
to-peer network. e peers in this network follow a consensus
protocol that dictates which peer is allowed to append the next
block. By introducing the concept of smart contracts, Ethereum [41]
revolutionized the way digital assets are traded. As smart contracts
govern more and more valuable assets, the contracts themselves
have come under aack from hackers.
Smart contracts are programs that are stored and executed across
blockchain peers. ey are deployed and invoked via transactions.
Deployed smart contracts are immutable, thus any bugs present
during deployment [2], or as a result of changes to the blockchain
protocol [7], can make a smart contract vulnerable. Moreover, since
contract owners are anonymous, responsible disclosure is usually
infeasible or very hard in practice. ough smart contracts can
be implemented with upgradeability and destroyability in mind,
this is not compulsory. As a maer of fact, Ethereum already faced
several devastating aacks on vulnerable smart contracts.
In 2016, an aacker exploited a reentrancy bug in a crowdfund-
ing smart contract known as the DAO. e aacker exploited the
capability of recursively calling a payout function contained in the
contract. e aacker managed to drain over $150 million [32]
worth of cryptocurrency from the smart contract. e DAO hack
was a poignant demonstration of the impact that insecure smart
contracts can have. e Ethereum market cap value dropped from
over $1.6 billion before the aack, to values below $1 billion aer
the aack, in less than a day. Another example happened with the
planned Constantinople hard fork in January 2019. Ethereum was
scheduled to receive an update intended to introduce a cheaper
gas cost for certain smart contract operations. On the eve of the
hard fork, a new reentrancy issue caused by this update was de-
tected. It turned out that the reduction of gas costs also enabled
reentrancy aacks on smart contracts that were previously secure.
is resulted in the update being delayed [7]. A third example is
the Parity wallet hack. In 2017, the Parity wallet smart contract
was aacked twice due to a bug in the access control logic. e
bug allowed anyone to claim ownership of the smart contract and
to take control of all the funds. e rst aack resulted in over
$30 million being stolen [44], whereas the second aack resulted
in roughly $155 million being locked forever [29].
e manner in which these issues are currently handled is not
ideal. At the moment, whenever a major vulnerability is detected by
the Ethereum community, it can take several days or weeks for the
community to issue a critical update and even longer for all nodes to
adopt this update. Such a delay extends the window for exploitation
and can have dire eects on the trading value of the underlying
cryptocurrency. Moreover, the lack of a standardised procedure to
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deal with vulnerable smart contracts, has led to a “Wild West”-like
situation where several self-appointed white hats started aacking
smart contracts in order to protect the funds that are at risk from
other malicious aackers [4]. However, in some cases the eects of
aacks can cause a split in the community so contentious that it
leads to a hard fork, such as in the case of the DAO hack which led
to the birth of the Ethereum classic blockchain [32].
Academia has proposed a plethora of dierent tools that al-
low users to scan smart contracts for vulnerabilities prior to de-
ploying them on the blockchain or interacting with them (see
e.g. [21, 23, 36, 38]). However, by design these tools cannot protect
vulnerable contracts that have already been deployed. Grossman et
al. [12] are the rst to present ECFChecker, a tool that allows to
dynamically check executed transactions for reentrancy. However,
ECFChecker does not prevent reentrancy aacks. In order to pro-
tect already deployed contracts, Rodler et al. [31] propose Sereum,
a modied Ethereum client that detects and reverts1 transactions
that trigger reentrancy aacks. Sereum leverages the principle
that every exploit is performed via a transaction. Unfortunately,
Sereum has three major drawbacks. First, it requires the client to
be modied whenever a new type of vulnerability is found. Second,
not only the tool itself, but also any updates to it must be manu-
ally adopted by the majority of nodes for its security provisions
to become eective. ird, their detection technique can only de-
tect reentrancy aacks, despite there being many other types of
aacks [2].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce a novel domain-specic language, which
enables the description of so-called aack paerns. ese
paerns reect malicious control and data ows that occur
during execution of malicious transactions.
• We present ÆGIS, a tool that reverts malicious transac-
tions in real-time using aack paerns, thereby preventing
aacks on deployed smart contracts.
• We propose a novel way to quickly propagate security up-
dates without relying on client-side update mechanisms, by
making use of a smart contract to store and vote upon new
aack paerns. Storing paerns in a smart contract en-
sures integrity, decentralizes security updates and provides
full transparency on the proposed paerns.
• We illustrate the eectiveness by providing paerns to
prevent the two most prominent hacks in Ethereum, the
DAO and Parity wallet hacks.
• Finally, we provide a detailed comparison to current state-
of-the-art runtime detection tools and perform a large-scale
analysis on 4.5 million blocks. e results demonstrate that
ÆGIS achieves beer precision than current state-of-the-
art tools.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary background for under-
standing the seing of our work. We describe the Ethereum block-
chain and its capability of executing smart contracts. We focus on
1Consuming gas, without leing the transaction aect the state of the blockchain.
Ethereum since it is currently the most prominent blockchain plat-
form when it comes to smart contract deployment. Finally, we also
provide background information on the two most prominent smart
contract vulnerabilities, namely, reentrancy and access control.
2.1 Ethereum and Smart Contracts
Ethereum. e Ethereum blockchain is a decentralized public
ledger that is maintained by a network of nodes that distrust one
another. Every node runs one of several existing Ethereum clients.
e clients can operate with dierent congurations. For instance,
nodes who are congured to mine blocks are called miners. Miners
execute transactions, include them in blocks and append them
to the blockchain. ey compete to create a block by solving a
cryptographic puzzle. Once they succeed, the block is proposed to
the network. Other miners verify the new block and either accept
or reject it. A miner whose block is included in the blockchain
is rewarded with a block reward and the execution fees from the
included transactions.
Transactions. Transactions are used to modify state in Ethereum.
As such, they allow users to transfer ether (Ethereum’s cryptocur-
rency), and to create smart contracts or trigger their execution.
Transactions are created using an account. ere are two types of
accounts in Ethereum, user accounts and contract accounts. Trans-
actions are given a certain amount of gas to execute, called the gas
limit. Gas is a unit which is used to measure the use of computing
resources. Gas can be converted to ether through the so-called gas
price of a transaction. Gas limit and gas price can be chosen by the
creator of the transaction. Together they determine the fee that
the user is willing to pay for the inclusion of their transaction into
the blockchain. Moreover, transactions also contain a destination
address. It identies the recipient of the transaction, and it can
be either a user account or a smart contract. Transactions can
also carry value that is transferred to the recipient. Once created,
transactions are broadcast to the network. Miners then execute
the transactions and include them into blocks. Smart contracts (i.e.
contract accounts) are created by leaving the destination address
of a transaction empty. e bytecode that is provided within the
transaction is then copied into the blockchain and it is given a
unique address that identies the smart contract.
Smart Contracts. Smart contracts are fully-edged programs that
are stored and executed across the blockchain. ey are developed
using a dedicated high-level programming language that compiles
into low-level bytecode. is bytecode gets interpreted by the
Ethereum Virtual Machine. Smart contracts contain functions that
can be triggered via transactions. e name of the function as
well as the data to be executed is included in the data eld of the
transaction. A default function or so-called fallback function is
executed whenever the provided function name is not recognized
by the smart contract. Moreover, smart contracts can initiate calls
to other smart contracts. us, a single transaction may interact
with several smart contracts that call one another. By default smart
contracts cannot be destroyed or updated. It is the task of the
developer to implement these capabilities before deploying the
smart contract. Unfortunately, many smart contracts are released
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1 contract A { // Victim contract
2 ...
3 function withdraw () public {
4 if (credit[msg.sender ]) {
5 msg.sender.call.value(credit[msg.sender ])();
6 credit[msg.sender] = 0;
7 }
8 }
9
10 contract B { // Exploiting contract
11 ...
12 function () public payable {
13 A.withdraw ();
14 }
15 }
Figure 1: Example of a reentrancy vulnerability.
without destroyability or upgradeability in mind. As a result, many
contracts remain vulnerable or active on the blockchain even past
their utility. As mentioned earlier, once deployed, smart contracts
are immutable, they cannot be modied and bugs cannot be xed.
us, it is not possible to update a smart contract in the later run.
EVM.e Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is a purely stack-based,
register-less virtual machine that supports a Turing-complete in-
struction set of opcodes. ese opcodes allow smart contracts to
perform memory operations and interact with the blockchain, such
as retrieving specic information (e.g., the current block number).
Ethereum makes use of gas to make sure that contracts terminate
and to prevent denial-of-service aacks. It assigns a gas cost to the
execution of an opcode. e execution of a smart contract results in
the modication of its state. e laer is stored on the blockchain
and consists of a balance and a storage. e balance represents the
amount of ether currently owned by the smart contract. e storage
is organized as a key-value store and allows the smart contract to
store values and keep state across executions. During execution,
the EVM holds a machine state µ = (д,pc,m, i, s), where д is the
gas available, pc is the program counter,m represents the memory
contents, i is the active number of words in memory and s is the
content of the stack. In summary, the EVM is a transaction-based
state machine that updates a smart contract based on transaction
input data and the smart contract’s bytecode.
2.2 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
Although, a number of smart contract vulnerabilities exist [2], in
this work, we primarily focus on two types of vulnerabilities that
have been dened by the NCC Group as the top two vulnerabilities
in their Decentralized Application Security Project [13]: reentrancy
and access control.
Reentrancy Vulnerabilities. Reentrancy occurs whenever a con-
tract calls another contract, which then calls back into the original
contract, thereby creating a reentrant call. is is not an issue
as long as all the state updates that depend on the call from the
original contract are performed before the call. In other words,
reentrancy only becomes problematic when a contract updates
its state aer calling another contract. A malicious contract can
take advantage of this by recursively calling a contract until all
the funds are drained. Figure 1 provides an example of a malicious
reentrancy. Contract B contains a fallback function (line 12-14),
a default function that is automatically executed when no other
function is called. In this example, the fallback function of contract
B calls the withdraw function of contractA. Assuming that contract
B already deposited some ether in contract A, contract A now calls
contract B to transfer back its deposited ether. However, the trans-
fer results in calling the fallback function of contract B once again,
which results in reentering contract A and once more transferring
the value of the deposited ether to contract B. is repeats until
the balance of contract A becomes zero or the execution runs out
of gas.
Reentrancy vulnerabilities were extensively studied by Rodler
et al. [31], and can be divided into four distinct categories: same-
function reentrancy, cross-function reentrancy, delegated reentrancy
and create-based reentrancy. Same-function reentrancy occurs
whenever an aacker reenters the original contract via the same
function (see Figure 1). Cross-function reentrancy builds on the
same-function reentrancy. However, here the aacker takes ad-
vantage of another function that shares a state with the original
function. Delegated reentrancy and create-based reentrancy are
similar to same-function reentrancy, but use dierent opcodes to
initiate the call. Specically, delegated reentrancy can occur using
either the DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE opcodes, while create-based
reentrancy only occurs when using the CREATE opcode. While the
DELEGATECALL and CALLCODE opcodes behave roughly similar to
the CALL opcode, the CREATE opcode causes a new contract to be
created and the contract constructor to be executed. is newly
created contract can then call and reenter the original contract.
Access Control Vulnerabilities. Access control vulnerabilities
result from incorrectly enforced user access control policies in
smart contracts. Such vulnerabilities allow aackers to gain ac-
cess to privileged contract functions that would normally not be
available to them. e most famous examples of this type of vulner-
ability are the two Parity MultiSig-Wallet hacks [29, 44]. e issue
originates from the fact that the developers of the Parity wallet
decided to split some of the contract logic into a separate smart
contract named WalletLibrary. is had the advantage of reusing
parts of the code for multiple wallets allowing users to save on gas
costs during deployment. A simplied version of the code can be
seen in Figure 2. As can be seen in line 17-20, the initialisation
of the wallet is performed via the initWallet function located in
contract L, which is called by the constructor of contract W . In
addition, any unmatched function calls to contractW are caught by
the fallback function in line 6-8, which redirects the call to contract
L by means of the DELEGATECALL operation. Unfortunately, in the
rst version of the Parity MultiSig-Wallet, the developers forgot to
write a safety check for the initWallet function, ensuring that the
function can only be called once. As a result an aacker was able to
gain ownership of contractW by calling the initWallet function
via the fallback function. Once in control the aacker withdrew all
the funds by invoking the execute function (line 32-34).
Aer the rst Parity hack, a new Parity MultiSig-Wallet Library
contract was deployed addressing the issue above. In the newly
deployed version, the initWallet function was not part of the
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1 contract W { // Wallet contract
2 ...
3 function W(address _owner) { // Contructor
4 L.delegatecall("initWallet(address)", _owner);
5 }
6 function () payable {
7 L.delegatecall(msg.data);
8 }
9 }
10
11 contract L { // Library contract
12 ...
13 modifier onlyOwner {
14 if (m_ownerIndex[msg.sender] > 0) _;
15 }
16 ...
17 function initWallet(address [] _owners , uint
_required , uint _daylimit) {
18 initDaylimit(_daylimit);
19 initMultiowned(_owners , _required);
20 }
21 function initMultiowned(address [] _owners , uint
_required) {
22 ...
23 for (uint i = 0; i < _owners.length; ++i) {
24 ...
25 m_ownerIndex[_owners[i]] = 2+i;
26 }
27 ...
28 }
29 function execute(address _to , uint _value , bytes
_data) onlyOwner {
30 _to.call.value(_value)(_data));
31 }
32 function kill(address _to) onlyOwner {
33 suicide(_to);
34 }
35 }
Figure 2: Example of an access control vulnerability.
constructor anymore, but had to be called separately aer deploy-
ment. However, the developers did not call the initWallet func-
tion aer deployment. Hence, contract L remained uninitialised,
meaning that the library contract itself had no owners. As a result,
3 months aer deployment a user known as devops199 was exper-
imenting with the previous Parity hack vulnerability and called
the initWallet function directly inside contract L, marking its
address as the owner. e user then called the kill function (line
32-34), which removed the executable code of contract L from the
blockchain2 and sent the remaining funds to the new owner. e
contract itself contained no funds, however it was used by multiple
Parity wallets which had the address of contract L dened as a
constant in their executable code. As a result any wallet trying to
use contract L as a library would now receive zero as return value,
eectively rendering the wallet unusable and therefore freezing the
funds contained in the wallets. is led the user to publicly disclose
the steps that led to this tragedy, with the words: “I accidentally
killed it.” [9].
2e contract code is technically not removed from the blockchain, however, the
contract’s code can no longer be executed on the blockchain, because the contract has
been marked as killed.
3 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss some of the works that are most closely
related to ours.
Security Analysis of Smart Contracts. As with any program,
smart contracts may contain bugs and can be vulnerable to ex-
ploitation. As discussed in [2], dierent types of vulnerabilities
exist, oen leading to nancial losses. e issue is made worse by
the fact that smart contracts are immutable. Once deployed, they
cannot be altered and vulnerabilities cannot be xed. In addition
to that, automated tools for launching aacks exist [21].
Several defense mechanisms have been proposed to detect se-
curity vulnerabilities in smart contracts. is includes tools such
as Erays [46], designed to provide smart contract auditors with
a reverse engineered pseudo code of a contract from its bytecode.
e interpretation of the pseudo code however remains a slow and
gruelling task. More automated tools have also been proposed
beneting from regular expressions [43] and machine learning
techniques [34] to detect vulnerabilities.
A wealth of security research has focused on the creation of
static analysis tools to automatically detect vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. Formal verication has been used together with a formal
denition of the EVM [1, 16], or by rst converting smart con-
tracts into the formal language F* [5, 11]. Other works focused
on analysing the higher level solidity code [10, 35], which limits
the scope to those contracts with available source code. Another
approach is to apply static analysis on the smart contract bytecode
[38]. A technique commonly used for this purpose is symbolic exe-
cution, designed to thoroughly explore the state space of a smart
contract utilising constraint solving. It has been used to detect con-
tracts with vulnerabilities [23, 28], to nd misbehaving contracts
[20, 26, 37], or detect integer bugs [19, 36]. Fuzzing techniques have
also been applied [15, 18]. In [42] the authors propose Harvey,
a greybox fuzzer that selects appropriate inputs and transaction
sequences to increase code coverage. Fuzzing techniques however
involve a trade-o between the number of discovered paths and
the eciency in input generation.
While all the listed tools help identify vulnerabilities, they cannot
protect already deployed smart contracts from being exploited.
erefore, to deal with the issue of vulnerabilities in deployed smart
contracts, [12, 31] propose a modication to the Ethereum client,
that would allow detection and prevent exploitation of reentrancy
vulnerabilities at runtime. However, these approaches only deal
with reentrancy and require all the clients in the network to be
modied. is is an issue for the following reasons. On one hand,
every update of the vulnerability detection soware requires an
update of the dierent Ethereum client implementations. is is
true for both bug xes and functionality upgrades, for example
the detection of new vulnerabilities. On the other hand, every
modication of the clients needs to be adopted by all the nodes
participating in the Ethereum blockchain. is requires time and
breaks compatibility between updated and non-updated clients. In
this work, we propose a generic solution that protects contracts and
users from existing and future vulnerabilities, without requiring
client modications and forks every time a new vulnerable smart
contract is found.
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Wang et al. [40] propose an approach to detect vulnerabilities
at runtime based on two invariants that follow the intuition that
most vulnerabilities are due to a mismatch between the transferred
amount and the amount reected by the contract’s internal book-
keeping logic. However, this approach has three main drawbacks.
First, it requires the automated and correct identication of book-
keeping variables, which besides being a non-trivial task also does
not hold for every contract, since there can be contracts that do
not use internal bookkeeping logic but are nevertheless vulnerable.
Second, their approach does not model environmental information
such as timestamps or block numbers, which does not allow them to
detect vulnerabilities such as timestamp dependence or transaction
order dependency, whereas our approach models environmental
information and allows for the detection of these vulnerabilities.
Finally, Wang et al.’s approach can only detect violations of safety
properties and not violations of liveness properties such as the
Parity Wallet Hack 2. In this work, we demonstrate that our ap-
proach is capable of detecting both Parity wallet hacks and therefore
violations to safety as well as liveness properties.
Blockchain-Based Voting. Since blockchains provide the means
for transparency and decentralization, multiple blockchain-based
solutions have been proposed for performing electronic voting [3,
17, 27]. Interestingly, with the recent developments in quantum
computers, recent work also has started to focus on the development
of quantum-resistant blockchain-based voting schemes [33]. ese
solutions can all be categorised into two categories: cryptocurrency-
based and smart-contract-based.
Cryptocurrency-based solutions focus on using payments as
a proxy for votes in an election. When a voter wishes to cast a
vote, he or she makes a payment to the address of the candidate.
Lee et al. [22] proposed such a system in the Bitcoin network.
However, their system requires a trusted third party to perform the
ballot counting. Zao et al. [45] were the rst to propose a voting
scheme using the public Bitcoin network while preserving the
privacy of the votes. Another well-known cryptocurrency-based
solution is CarbonVote [8]. It was introduced in the aermath of
the DAO hack to allow the Ethereum Foundation to determine if
the Ethereum community wanted a hard fork or not. e tallying
was performed by counting the amount of ether that each address
received. Needless to say, such a system gives a tremendous amount
of voting power to users with a large amount of funds.
Smart-contract-based voting relies on a decentralized application
to assist the voting process – there is no central entity. McCorry et
al. [24] propose a practical implementation of the Open Vote Net-
work [14] in the form of a smart contract deployed on the Ethereum
blockchain for boardroom voting. eir implementation is self-
tallying and provides, in addition to vote privacy, also transparency.
Voting proceeds in several rounds, where the voters rst broadcast
their voting key, followed by a proof that their vote is binary (a
“yes” or “no” vote). A nal tally round allows anyone to calculate
the total sum of votes, without revealing individual ballots. e
voting mechanism described in this paper is inspired by McCorry
et al.’s proposed solution and implementation. e limitations of
their proposed solution, namely having a binary voting system
and limiting the number of voters to less than 50 participants, are
acceptable for our purposes.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the details of our solution towards a
generic and decentralized way to prevent any type of aacks on
already deployed smart contracts. Our idea is to bundle every
Ethereum client with a runtime analysis tool, that interacts with
the EVM and is capable of interpreting so-called aack paerns, and
reverting transactions that match these paerns. Aack paerns
are described using our domain-specic language (DSL), which
is tailored to the execution model of the EVM and which allows
to easily describe malicious control and data ows. e fact that
we shi the capability of detecting aacks from the client-side
implementation to the DSL, gives us the advantage of being able to
quickly propose mitigations against new vulnerabilities, without
having to modify the Ethereum client. Existing approaches, such
as Sereum for example, require the client-side implementation to
be modied whenever a new vulnerability is found.
4.1 Generic Attack Detection
Aacks are detected in our system through the use of paerns,
which are described using our DSL. e DSL allows for the deni-
tion of malicious events that occur during the execution of EVM
instructions. e syntax of our DSL is dened by the following BNF
grammar:
〈instr〉 ::= CALL | CALLDATALOAD | SSTORE | JUMPI | . . .
〈exec〉 ::= depth | pc | address | stack(int) | stack.result |
| memory(int, int) | transaction.〈trans〉
| block.〈block〉
〈trans〉 ::= hash | value | from | to | . . .
〈block〉 ::= number | gasUsed | gasLimit | . . .
〈comp〉 ::= < | > | ≤ | ≥ | = | , | + | - | · | /
〈expr〉 ::= (src.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 〈expr〉) [∧ 〈expr〉]
| (〈expr〉 〈comp〉 dst.〈exec〉) [∧ 〈expr〉]
| (src.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 src.〈exec〉) [∧ 〈expr〉]
| (src.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 dst.〈exec〉) [∧ 〈expr〉]
| (dst.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 dst.〈exec〉) [∧ 〈expr〉]
| (src.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 int) | (dst.〈exec〉 〈comp〉 int)
〈rel〉 ::= ⇒ | { |→
〈paern〉 ::= (opcode = 〈instr〉) 〈rel〉 (opcode = 〈instr〉) [where
〈expr〉]
| 〈paern〉 〈rel〉 (opcode = 〈instr〉) [where 〈expr〉]
| (opcode = 〈instr〉) 〈rel〉 〈paern〉 [where 〈expr〉]
Figure 3: DSL for describing attack patterns.
A paern is a sequence of relations between EVM instructions
that may occur at runtime. We distinguish between three types of
relations, a “control ow” relation (⇒), a “data ow” relation ({),
and a “follows” relation (→). A control ow relation means that an
instruction is control dependent on another instruction. A data-ow
relation means that an instruction is data dependent on another
5
CALL
CALL…
…
A.withdraw()
msg.sender.call.
value(…)()
CALL
CALL…
…
A.withdraw()
SSTORE …
credit[msg.sender] = 0
…
⟹
msg.sender.call.
value(…)()
…
…
SSTORE⟹ …credit[msg.sender] = 0…
…
address = B
depth = 1
⟹
address = A
depth = 2
address = B
depth = 3
address = A
depth = 4
address = …
depth = n
⟹ ⟹ ⟹
⟹ ⟹
pc = 272
stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 937stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 272stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 937stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …] pc = 8555stack = [𝑖, 𝑣, …] pc = 8555stack = [𝑖, 𝑣, …]
Figure 4: Execution example of a reentrancy attack, where the stack values д (gas), t (to), a (amount), i (index) and v (value)
represent the respective parameters passed to the instructions during execution. A control ow relation is depicted using⇒,
while→ depicts a follows relation.
instruction. A follows relation means that an instruction is executed
aer another instruction, without necessarily being control or data
dependent on the other instruction. A relation is always between
two EVM opcodes: a source opcode (src) and a destination opcode
(dst). e source marks the beginning of the relation, whereas
the destination denes the end of the relation. Moreover, the DSL
allows to create conjunctions of expressions that allow to compare
the execution environment between source and destination. e
execution environment includes the current depth of the call stack
(depth), the current value of the program counter (pc), the address
of the contract that is currently being executed (address), the
current values on the stack (stack) as well as the result of an
operation that is pushed onto the stack (stack.result), the current
values stored in memory (memory), and nally, properties of the
current transaction that is being executed (e.g. hash) as well as
properties of the current block that is being executed (e.g. number).
e stack is addressable via an integer, where 0 denes the top
element on the stack. e memory is addressable via two integers:
an oset and a size. In the following, we explain the semantics of our
DSL via two concrete examples of aack paerns: same-function
reentrancy and the parity wallet hack 1.
Same-Function Reentrancy. Reconsider the reentrancy example
that was described in Section 2.2. Figure 4, illustrates the control
ow as well as the follows relations that occur during the execution
of that example. e execution starts with contract address B and
a call stack depth of 1. Eventually, contract B calls the withdraw
function of contract A, which results in executing the CALL instruc-
tion and increasing the depth of the call stack to 2, and switching
the address of the contract that is being executed to contract A.
Next, contract A sends some funds to contract B, which also results
in executing the CALL instruction and increasing the depth of the
call stack to 3, and switching the address of the contract that is
being executed back to contract B. As a result, the fallback func-
tion of contract B is called, which in turn calls again the withdraw
function of contract A. is sequence of calls repeats until the
balance of contract A is either empty or the execution runs out of
gas. Eventually, the state in contract A is updated by executing the
SSTORE instruction. Given these observations, we can now create
the following aack paern in order to detect and thereby prevent
same-function reentrancy:
( opcode = CALL ) ⇒ ( opcode = CALL ) where
( s r c . s t a c k ( 1 ) = d s t . s t a c k ( 1 ) ) ∧
( s r c . a d d r e s s = d s t . a d d r e s s ) ∧
( s r c . pc = d s t . pc ) →
( opcode = SSTORE ) → ( opcode = SSTORE ) where
( s r c . s t a c k ( 0 ) = d s t . s t a c k ( 0 ) ) ∧
( s r c . a d d r e s s = d s t . a d d r e s s ) ∧
( s r c . depth > d s t . depth )
is aack paern evaluates to true if a transaction meets the
following two conditions:
(1) there is a control ow relation between two CALL instruc-
tions, where both instructions share the same call destina-
tion (i.e. src. stack(1) = dst.stack(1)), are executed
by the same contract (i.e. src.address = dst.address)
and share the same program counter (i.e. src.pc = dst.pc);
(2) two SSTORE instructions follow the previous control ow
relation, where both instructions write to the same storage
location (i.e. src.stack(0) = dst.stack(0)), are exe-
cuted by the same contract (i.e. src.address = dst.address)
and where the rst instruction has a higher call stack depth
than the second instruction (i.e. src.depth > dst.depth).
It is worth mentioning that we compare the program counter values
of the two CALL instructions in order to make sure that it is the
same function that is being called, as our goal is to detect only
same-function reentrancy.
Parity Wallet Hack 1. Reconsider the access control example de-
scribed in Section 2.2. Figure 5 illustrates the relevant control ow,
data ow and follows relations that occur during the execution
of that example. We note that the execution example is divided
into two separate transactions. In the rst transaction, the aacker
sets itself as the owner, whereas in the second transaction the
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stack = [𝑔, 𝑡, 𝑎, …]
transaction hash = 0x9dbf03…ef75ec transaction hash = 0xeef10f…a7be7c
Figure 5: Execution example of an attack on an access control vulnerability. A data ow relation is depicted with {. e
variables g, t and a are as discussed in Figure 4.
aacker transfers all the funds to itself. Although in reality an at-
tacker performs two separate transactions, in our methodology, the
two transactions are represented as a single sequence of execution
events. For both transactions, the execution starts with contract
addressW eventually making a delegate call to contract address L,
as part of the aacker calling the fallback function of contractW . In
the rst transaction, we see that at a certain point contract L copies
data from the transaction using the CALLDATACOPY instruction and
stores it into storage via the SSTORE instruction. An interesting
observation here is that state is shared across transactions through
storage. In the second transaction, the data that has previously
been stored is now loaded onto the stack and used by a compari-
son. A comparison is ultimately reected via the JUMPI instruction.
Finally, we see that the comparison follows a CALLDATALOAD in-
struction whose data is used by a call CALL instruction. Given these
observations, we are now able to create the following aack paern
in order to detect and thereby prevent the rst Parity wallet hack:
( opcode = DELEGATECALL ) ⇒ ( opcode = CALLDATACOPY) {
( opcode = SSTORE ) { ( opcode = JUMPI ) where
( s r c . t r a n s a c t i o n . hash , d s t . t r a n s a c t i o n . hash ) →
( ( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { ( opcode = CALL ) ) where
( d s t . s t a c k ( 2 ) > 0 )
e above aack paern evaluates to true if the following two
conditions are met:
(1) there is a transaction with a control ow relation between
a DELEGATECALL instruction and a CALLDATACOPY instruc-
tion, where the data of the CALLDATACOPY instruction ows
into an SSTORE instruction;
(2) there is another transaction (i.e. src.transaction.hash
, dst.transaction.hash) where the data that has been
previously stored via the SSTORE instruction ows into
a JUMPI instruction and is followed by a CALLDATALOAD
instruction whose data ows into a CALL instruction that
sends out funds (i.e. dst.stack(2) ¿ 0).
It is worth noting that the Parity wallet aack is a multi-transactional
aack and that it is therefore signicantly dierent from a reen-
trancy aack, that is solely based on a single transaction. For more
examples of aack paerns, please refer to Table 5 in Appendix A.
Figure 6: An illustrative example of ÆGIS’s workow: step
1) A benign user detects a vulnerability and proposes a pat-
tern (written using our DSL) to the smart contract. Step 2)
Eligible voters vote to either accept or reject the pattern. If
the majority votes to accept the pattern, then all the clients
are updated and the pattern is activated. Step 3) An attacker
tries but fails to exploit a vulnerable smart contract due to
the voted pattern matching the malicious transaction.
4.2 Decentralized Security Updates
While our approach of using a DSL allows us to have a generic
solution for detecting aacks, it still leaves two open questions:
(1) How do we distribute and enforce the same paerns across
all the clients?
(2) How do we decentralize the governance of paerns in order
to prevent a single entity from deciding which paerns are
added or removed?
e answer to these questions is to use a smart contract that is
deployed on the blockchain itself. is solves the problem of dis-
tributing and enforcing that the same paerns are always used
across all clients. Specically, paerns are stored inside the smart
contract and the blockchain protocol itself guarantees that every
client knows about the exact same state and therefore has access
to exactly the same paerns. e second problem of decentralizing
the governance of paerns, is solved by allowing the proposal and
voting of paerns via the smart contract as depicted in Figure 6.
e contract maintains a list of eligible voters that vote for either
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Figure 7: Architecture of ÆGIS. e dark gray boxes repre-
sent ÆGIS’s main components.
accepting or rejecting a new paern. If the majority has voted with
“yes”, i.e. to accept the paern, then it is added to the list of active
paerns. In that case, every client is automatically notied through
the mechanism of smart contract events, and retrieves the updated
list of paerns from the blockchain. In other words, if a paern
is accepted by the voting mechanism, it is updated across all the
clients through the existing consensus mechanism of the Ethereum
blockchain. However, solving the second problem using a voting
mechanism opens up a new problem concerning the requirements
needed for governing the votes. In voting literature, veriability
and privacy are typically seen as key requirements. Veriability
concerns linking the output to the input in a veriable way. Privacy
concerns whether a vote can be linked back to a voter. In addition,
we argue that the situation here is more akin to boardroom voting
than to general elections, because it should be possible to hold vot-
ers accountable. is means that privacy must be maintained only
until the election is over. Finally, the voting system must not be
favorable to any voters – e.g., it should not confer an advantage to
voters that cast their vote late. is nal property is called fairness.
It is worth noting that fairness requires privacy during the voting
phase. is leads to the following three requirements:
(1) Veriability: e outcome of the vote must be veriably
related to the votes as cast by the voters;
(2) Accountability: Voters can be held accountable for how
they voted;
(3) Fairness: No intermediate information must be leaked.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide the implementation details of our solu-
tion called ÆGIS. e code is publicly available3. Figure 7, provides
an overview of the architecture of ÆGIS and highlights its main
components. ÆGIS is implemented on top of Trinity4, an Ethereum
client implemented in Python.
5.1 Ethereum Client
EVM. We modied the EVM of Trinity such that it keeps track
of all the executed instructions and their states at runtime, in the
form of an ordered list. We refer to this list as the execution trace.
3hps://github.com/christoorres/Aegis
4hps://trinity.ethereum.org/
Each record in this list contains the executed opcode, the value
of the program counter, the depth of the call stack, the address of
the contract that is being executed, and nally, all the values that
were stored on the stack and in memory. is list is passed to the
interpreter component of ÆGIS.
Interpreter. e interpreter loops through the list of executed
instructions and passes the relevant instructions to the control ow
and data ow extractor components. It is also responsible for sig-
nalling the EVM a revert in case the execution trace matches an
aack paern.
Control Flow Extractor. e control ow extractor is responsible
for inferring control ow information. We do so by dynamically
building a call tree from the instructions received by the interpreter.
A control ow relation is reported if there exists a path along the
call tree, from the source instruction to the destination instruction
dened in a given paern. us, control ow relations represent
call dependencies between two instructions.
Data Flow Extractor. e data ow extractor is responsible for
collecting data ow information. We track the ow of data be-
tween instructions by using dynamic taint analysis. Taint is intro-
duced whenever we come across a source instruction and checked
whenever we come across a destination instruction. Source and
destination instructions are dened by a given paern. Taint propa-
gation follows the semantics of the EVM [41] across stack, memory
and storage. We perform byte-level precision tainting. Taint that
is stored across stack and memory is volatile, meaning that it is
cleared across transactions. Taint that is stored across storage is
persistent, meaning that it remains in storage across transactions.
is allows us to perform inter-transactional taint analysis. A data
ow relation is given if taint ows from a source instruction into a
destination instruction.
Pattern Parser. e paern parser is responsible for extracting
and parsing the paerns from the voting smart contract. We imple-
mented our paern language using textX 5, a Python framework
providing a meta-language for building DSLs.
5.2 ÆGIS Smart Contract
e ÆGIS smart contract ensures proper curation of the list of
active paerns. We implemented our smart contract in Solidity.
As previously mentioned, paerns are accepted or removed via
a voting mechanism. e contract holds all proposed additions
and removals of paerns and allows a vote on them within a set
time window. e duration can be congured and updated by the
contract owner. Proposals are open to the public and anyone can
propose an addition to or removal from the list of paerns.
Fairness. Votes should remain secret until all eligible voters have
had sucient opportunity to vote. erefore, two time windows
are employed. e rst window is for sending a commitment that
includes a deposit. e second window is for revealing a vote in-
cluding the return of the commied deposits. e two windows
5hps://github.com/textX/textX
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are illustrated in Figure 8. In the gure, tp represents the point in
time when a paern is proposed and marks the start of the commit
window. tc marks the end of the commit window and the start of
the reveal window. Lastly, tr marks the end of the reveal window
and the time when the paern list is updated in case of a positive
vote outcome. A commitment is a hash of the vote ID, the voter’s
vote and a nonce. e vote ID is a hash of the proposed paern
and identies the paern that is being voted on. e voter’s vote is
encoded as a boolean. e nonce ensures that commitments cannot
be replayed. e smart contract records these commitments, which
must be sent with the predened deposit and within the predened
time window. During the commitment phase no one knows how
anyone else has voted on a given paern, and so cannot be swayed
by the decisions of others. However, the process should ultimately
be transparent to both voters and non-voters to foster trust in the
system. As such, during the second window, the reveal window, all
voters reveal how they have voted. ey must reveal their vote in
order to get their deposit back. No commits may be made once the
reveal period has started.
timetrtctp
commit window reveal window
Figure 8: Timeline of the two voting stages.
Tallying. e voting ends either when more than 50% (50%+1 vote)
of the total number of votes reaches either accept or reject, or when
the time window for revealing expires with less than 50% having
been reached. In case the voting has ended but the reveal window
has not yet passed, any remaining voters are still eligible to reveal
their vote, such that their deposit can be returned. e reveal period
is bounded so that paerns are accepted or rejected in a practical
amount of time. In the event of a successful vote, the paern to
which the vote pertains is added to or removed from the record held
by the contract, according to the proposal. If a vote is unsuccessful,
i.e. no majority voted for the proposal, the record of paerns is not
changed.
Actors. ere are three types of actors: the proposers that submit
proposals to add or remove paerns, the voters that vote on pro-
posals, and the admins that govern the list of eligible voters as well
as the parameters of the smart contract (e.g. deposit, commit and
reveal windows, etc.). e ÆGIS smart contract allows every user
on the blockchain to become a proposer by submiing a proposal.
Voters then vote on the proposals by rst commiing their vote
and at a later stage revealing it. Not every user is an eligible voter.
Voters are only those users whose account address is stored in the
list of eligible voters maintained by the smart contract. Admins may
update the list of eligible voters. ey oversee the proper curation
of the smart contract and act as a governing body. Admins are
agreed upon o-chain and are represented by a multi-signature
wallet. A multi-signature wallet is an account address which only
performs actions if a group of users give their consent in form of a
signature.
Data Structures. e smart contract consists of several functions
and data structures that allow for the voting process to take place.
We make use of a number of modiers, which act as checks carried
out before specic functions are executed. We use these to check
that: 1) a voter is eligible, 2) a vote is in progress, 3) a reveal is
in progress and 4) the associated vote has ended. We use a struct
to hold the details of each vote, these include the patternID, the
proposed pattern and the startBlock. ese values enable us to
record the details needed to check when a vote ends, check that the
same paern has not already been proposed, and count the number
of votes. e struct is used in conjunction with a mapping, which
maps a 32 bytes value to the details of each vote. e 32 bytes value
represents the voteID of each vote, created by hashing unique vote
information. A constructor is used to dene, at contract launch, the
value of the necessary deposit and the time windows during which
voters can commit or reveal. e former is given in ether, while the
laer are given in number of blocks. e deposit is used to ensure
that those who commied a vote also reveal their vote. ese values
can be changed later using the contract’s admin functions.
Functionality. e public functions for the voting process are:
addProposal, removeProposal, commitToVote and revealVote.
Both proposal functions rst check if a vote with the same ID al-
ready exists, and if not create a new instance of voting details via
the mapping. Next, the commitToVote function can be used inside
the dened number of blocks to submit a unique hash of an eligible
voter’s vote. is function makes use of the canVote modier to
protect access. e voter’s commitment and vote hash are stored
only if the correct deposit amount was sent to the function. Once
the vote stage has ended the reveal stage begins. During this win-
dow the revealVote function, protected by the canVote modier,
processes vote revelations and returns deposits. e function checks
that the stored hash matches the hash calculated from the parame-
ters passed to it, and if so, returns the voter’s deposit and records
the vote. Lastly, it calls an internal function which tallies the votes
and adds or removes the paern if either the for or against vote has
reached over 50%. In this way the vote is self tallying. e paerns
are ultimately stored in an array that can be iterated over to ensure
each node has the full set. Finally, the contract also has two admin
functions: transferOwnership, changeVotingWindows. Both of
these are protected by the isOwner modier. e former allows the
current owning address to transfer control of the contract to a new
address. e laer allows the commit and reveal windows to be
changed as well as the amount required as a voting deposit.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the eectiveness and correctness of
ÆGIS, by conducting two experiments. In the rst experiment we
compare the eectiveness of ÆGIS to two state-of-the-art reen-
trancy detection tools: ECFChecker [12] and Sereum [31]. In the
second experiment we perform a large-scale analysis and measure
the correctness as well as the performance of ÆGIS across the rst
4.5 million blocks of the Ethereum blockchain.
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Table 1: Comparison between Sereum and ÆGIS on the eectiveness of detecting reentrancy attacks.
Smart Contract Reentrancy Type EC
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er
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Æ
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S
VulnBankNoLock
Same-Function TP TP TP
Cross-Function FN TP TP
VulnBankBuggyLock
Same-Function TN FP TN
Cross-Function FN TP TP
VulnBankSecureLock
Same-Function TN FP TN
Cross-Function TN FP TN
Table 2: Comparison between ECFChecker, Sereum and
ÆGIS on the eectiveness of detecting same-function and
cross-function reentrancy attacks with manually intro-
duced locks.
6.1 Comparison to Reentrancy Detection Tools
By analyzing transactions sent to contracts, Rodler et al.’s tool
Sereum agged 16 contracts as victims of reentrancy aacks. How-
ever, aer manual investigation the authors found that only 2 out of
the 16 contracts have actually become victims to reentrancy aacks.
We decided to analyze these 16 contracts and see if we face the same
challenges in classifying these contracts correctly. We contacted
the authors of Sereum and obtained the list of contract addresses.
Aerwards, we ran ÆGIS on all transactions related to the con-
tract addresses, up to block number 4,500,0006. Table 1 summarizes
our results and provides a comparison to the results obtained by
Sereum. From Table 1, we can observe that ÆGIS successfully de-
tects transactions related to the DAO contract and the DSEthToken
contract, as reentrancy aacks. Moreover, ÆGIS correctly ags the
remaining 14 contracts as not vulnerable. Hence, in contrast to
Sereum, ÆGIS produces no false positives on these 16 contracts.
Aer analyzing the false positives produced by Sereum, we con-
clude that ÆGIS does not produce the same false positives because
rst, ÆGIS does not use taint analysis in its paern and therefore
does not face issues of over-tainting, and secondly, it does not make
use of dynamic write locks to detect reentrancy.
6is is the maximum block number analyzed by the authors of Sereum.
6.1.1 Reentrancy with Locks. Besides evaluating Sereum on the
set of 16 real-world smart contracts, Rodler et al. also compared
Sereum to ECFChecker, using self-craed smart contracts as a
benchmark [30]. e goal of this benchmark is to provide means
to investigate the quality of reentrancy detection tools. e bench-
mark consists of three functionally equivalent contracts, except
that the rst contract does not employ any locking mechanism
to guard the reentry of functions (VulnBankNoLock), the second
contract employs partial implementation of a locking mechanism
(VulnBankBuggyLock), and the third contract employs a full im-
plementation of a locking mechanism (VulnBankSecureLock). As a
result, the rst contract is vulnerable to same-function reentrancy
as well as cross-function reentrancy. e second contract is vulner-
able to cross-function reentrancy, but not to same-function reen-
trancy. Finally, the third contract is safe regarding both types of
reentrancy. We deployed these three contracts on the Ethereum test
network called Ropsten and ran the three contracts against ÆGIS.
Table 2 contains our results and compares ÆGIS to ECFChecker
and Sereum. We can see that ECFChecker has diculties in detect-
ing cross-function reentrancy, whereas Sereum has diculties in
distinguishing between reentrancy and manually introduced locks.
is is probably due to the locking mechanism exhibiting exactly
the same paern as a reentrancy aack and Sereum being unable
to dierentiate between these two. We found that ÆGIS correctly
classies every contract as either vulnerable or not vulnerable in
all the test cases.
6.1.2 Unconditional Reentrancy. Calls that send ether are usu-
ally protected by a check in the form of an if, require, or assert.
Reentrancy aacks typically try to bypass these checks. However,
it is possible to write a contract, which does not perform any check
before sending ether. Rodler et al. present an example of such a
vulnerability and name it unconditional reentrancy (see Appendix B).
Moreover, they also nd an example of such a contract deployed on
the Ethereum blockchain7. When Sereum was published, it was not
able to detect this type of reentrancy since the authors assumed that
every call that may lead to a reentrancy is guarded by a condition.
However, the authors claim to have xed this issue by extending
Sereum to tracking data ows from storage to the parameters of
calls. We cannot verify this since the source code of Sereum is not
publicly available. We run ÆGIS on both examples, the manually
craed example by Rodler et al. and the contract deployed on the
7hps://etherscan.io/address/0xb7c5c5aa4d42967efe906e1b66cb8df9cebf04f7
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Vulnerability Contracts Transactions
Same-Function Reentrancy 7 822
Cross-Function Reentrancy 5 695
Delegated Reentrancy 0 0
Create-Based Reentrancy 0 0
Parity Wallet Hack 1 3 80
Parity Wallet Hack 2 236 236
Total Unique 248 1118
Table 3: Number of vulnerable contracts detected by ÆGIS.
Ethereum blockchain. ÆGIS correctly identies the unconditional
reentrancy contained in both examples without modifying the ex-
isting paerns. is is as expected, since in contrast to Sereum’s
initial way to detect reentrancy, ÆGIS’s reentrancy paerns do not
rely on the detection of conditions (i.e. JUMPI) to detect reentrancy.
6.2 Large-Scale Blockchain Analysis
In this experiment we analyse the rst 4.5 million blocks of the
Ethereum blockchain and compare our ndings to those of Rodler
et al. We started by scanning the Ethereum blockchain for smart
contracts that have been deployed until block 4,500,000. We found
675,444 successfully deployed contracts. e deployment times-
tamps of the found contracts range from August 7, 2015 to Novem-
ber 6, 2017. Next, we replayed the execution history of these 675,444
contracts. As part of the scanning we found that only 12 contracts
in our dataset have more than 10.000 transactions. erefore, to
reduce the execution time, we decided to limit our analysis to the
rst 10.000 transactions of each contract. In addition, similar to
Rodler et al., we tried our best to skip those transactions which
were involved in denial-of-service aacks as they would result in
high execution times8.
We ran ÆGIS on our set of 675,444 contracts using a 6-core Intel
Core i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz and 64 GB RAM. Our tool took on
average 108 milliseconds to analyse a transaction, with a median of
24 milliseconds per transaction. All in all, we re-executed 4,960,424
transactions with an average of 8 transactions per contract. Table 3
summarizes our results. ÆGIS found a total of 1,118 malicious
transactions and 248 unique contacts that have been exploited
through either a reentrancy or an access control vulnerability. More
specically, ÆGIS found that 7 contracts have become victim to
same-function reentrancy, 5 contracts to cross-function reentrancy,
3 contracts to the rst Parity wallet hack and 236 contracts to the
second Parity wallet hack. Similar to the results of Rodler et al.,
we did not nd any contracts to have become victim to delegated
reentrancy or create-based reentrancy. We validated all our results
by manually analyzing the source code (whenever it was publicly
available) and/or the execution traces of the agged contracts. Our
validation did not reveal any false positives.
Table 4 lists all the contract addresses that ÆGIS detected to
have become victim of a same-function reentrancy aack. e
block range denes the block heights where ÆGIS detected the
malicious transactions. e rst and second contract addresses
8hps://tinyurl.com/rvlvues
contained in Table 4 are the same as reported by Sereum, and
belong to the DSEthToken and DAO contract, respectively. e
rows highlighted in gray mark 5 contracts that have been agged
by ÆGIS but not by Sereum. Aer investigating the transac-
tions of these 5 contracts, we nd that the contract addresses
0x26b8af052895080148dabbc1007b3045f023916e and 0xbf7802
5535c98f4c605fbe9eaf672999abf19dc1 became victim to same-
function reentrancy, but seem to be contracts that have been de-
ployed with the purpose of studying the DAO hack. However, the
three other contract addresses seem to be true victims of reentrancy
aacks.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss alternatives to determine eligible voters,
highlight some of the current limitations as well as future research
directions for this work.
7.1 Determining Eligible Voters
e introduction of new paerns in ÆGIS depends on achieving
consensus in a predetermined group of voters. Although it may
intuitively make sense to let miners vote, they are not necessarily
a good t. eir interests may dier from those of smart contract
users. For example, depending on a paern’s complexity, it might
introduce an overhead in terms of execution time. Miners are then
incentivized to prefer simpler paerns that are evaluated quicker,
while smart contract users would prefer more secure paerns.
Alternatively, a group of trusted security experts could act as
eligible voters9. Security experts are (by denition) able to properly
evaluate paerns and have the interest in doing so. e voting
contract is then controlled by a group of trusted experts who are
decided upon o-chain by a group of admins. For transparency,
the identity of admins and experts would be exposed to the public
by mapping every identity to an Ethereum account. Changes to
the list of voters, the deposit, or the commit and reveal windows
are then visible to anyone via the blockchain. rough this setup,
security experts would be able to organise themselves with the voter
list being comprised of a curated group of knowledgeable people.
Such groups already exist in reality, for example, the members
of the Smart Contract Weakness Classication registry (SWC)10,
9Somewhat similar to how CVEs are handled.
10hps://smartcontractsecurity.github.io/SWC-registry/
Contract Address Block Range
0xd654bdd32fc99471455e86c2e7f7d7b6437e9179 1680024 - 1680238
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413 1718497 - 2106624
0xf01fe1a15673a5209c94121c45e2121fe2903416 1743596 - 1743673
0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 1881284 - 1881284
0x59752433dbe28f5aa59b479958689d353b3dee08 3160801 - 3160801
0xbf78025535c98f4c605e9eaf672999abf19dc1 3694969 - 3695510
0x26b8af052895080148dabbc1007b3045f023916e 4108700 - 4108700
Table 4: Same-function reentrancy vulnerable contracts de-
tected by ÆGIS. Contracts highlighted in gray have only
been detected by ÆGIS and not by Sereum.
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and would be a good t for our system. Moreover, misbehaving
or unresponsive experts could be easily removed by the group of
admins. Although this approach allows for scalability and control,
it has the disadvantage of introducing managing third-parties. at
runs counter to the decentralised concept of Ethereum.
Alternatively, there is also an option to select voters, while pre-
serving the decentralised concept of Ethereum. is is to remove
the role of admins altogether, and instead follow a self-organizing
strategy, similar to Proof-of-Stake. In this case, everyone is allowed
to become a voter through the purchase of (not prohibitively priced)
voting power. is could be achieved by depositing a xed amount
of ether into the voting smart contract as a form of collateral.
7.2 Adoption and Participation Incentives
e deployment of ÆGIS would require a modication of the
Ethereum consensus protocol, which would require existing Ether-
eum clients to be updated. is could be easily achieved though
a major release by including this one-time modication as part
of a scheduled hardfork. Another issue concerns the incentives
to propose and vote on paerns. While prestige or a feeling of
contributing to the security of Ethereum may be sucient for some,
more incentives may be needed to ensure that the protective capa-
bilities of ÆGIS are used to the full extent. A monetary incentive
could address this. at is, ÆGIS could be extended with automat-
ically paid rewards. In other words, ÆGIS could be extended to
enable bug bounties [6]. ÆGIS’s smart contract could be modied
such that, owners of smart contracts can register their contract ad-
dress by sending a transaction to ÆGIS’s voting smart contract and
deposit a bounty in the form of ether. en, proposers of paerns
would be rewarded automatically with the bounty by ÆGIS’s voting
smart contract, if their proposed paern is accepted by the group
of voters. Moreover, owners could simply replenish the bounty for
their contract by making new deposits to ÆGIS’s smart contract.
7.3 Limitations and Future Work
A current limitation of our tool is that proposed aack paerns are
submied in plain text to the smart contract. Potential aackers can
view the paerns and use them to nd vulnerable smart contracts.
To mitigate this, we propose to make use of encryption such that
only the voters would be able to view the paerns. However, this
would break the current capability of the smart contract being
self-tallying. Designing an encrypted and practical self-tallying
solution is le for future work. Finally, we intend to make use of
parallel execution inside the extractors and the checking of paerns
in order to improve the time required to analyse transactions.
8 CONCLUSION
Although academia proposed a number of tools to detect vulnera-
bilities in smart contracts, they all fail to protect already deployed
vulnerable smart contracts. One of the proposed solutions is to
modify the Ethereum clients in order to detect and revert transac-
tions that try to exploit vulnerable smart contracts. However, these
solutions require all the Ethereum clients to be modied every time
a new type of vulnerability is discovered. In this work, we intro-
duced ÆGIS, a system that detects and reverts aacks via aack
paerns. ese paerns describe malicious control and data ows
through the use of a novel domain-specic language. In addition,
we presented a novel mechanism for security updates that allows
these aack paerns to be updated quickly and transparently via
the blockchain, by using a smart contract as means of storing them.
Finally, we compared ÆGIS to two current state-of-the-art online
reentrancy detection tools. Our results show that ÆGIS not only
detects more aacks, but also has no false positives as compared to
current state-of-the-art.
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A COMPLETE LIST OF ÆGIS’S ATTACK
PATTERNS
Table 5 provides a complete list of vulnerabilities as well as their
respective aack paerns that ÆGIS is currently capable to detect.
B UNCONDITIONAL REENTRANCY
EXAMPLE
Figure 9 shows an example of a smart contract with an uncondi-
tional reentrancy. In this example an aacker rst deposits a small
amount of ether and then uses a reentrancy aack in order to drain
all the ether that every single user has deposited.
1 contract VulnBank {
2 mapping (address => uint) public userBalances;
3
4 function deposit () public payable {
5 userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
6 }
7
8 function withdrawAll () public {
9 uint amountToWithdraw = userBalances[msg.sender ];
10 msg.sender.call.value(amountToWithdraw)("");
11 userBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
12 }
13 }
Figure 9: Example of a contract that is vulnerable to uncon-
ditional reentrancy [30].
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Vulnerability Aack Paern
Same-Function
Reentrancy
(opcode = CALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALL) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Cross-Function
Reentrancy
(opcode = CALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALL) where
(src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧ (src.address = dst.address) ∧
(src.memory(src.stack (3), src.stack (4)) , dst.memory(dst.stack (3), dst.stack (4))) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Delegated
Reentrancy
(opcode = DELEGATECALL) ⇒ (opcode = DELEGATECALL) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
(opcode = CALLCODE) ⇒ (opcode = CALLCODE) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Create-Based
Reentrancy
(opcode = CREATE) ⇒ (opcode = CREATE) where (src.stack (1) = dst.stack (1)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.pc = dst.pc) →
(opcode = SSTORE) → (opcode = SSTORE) where (src.stack (0) = dst.stack (0)) ∧
(src.address = dst.address) ∧ (src.depth > dst.depth)
Parity Wallet
Hack 1
(opcode = DELEGATECALL) ⇒ (opcode = CALLDATACOPY) { (opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = JUMPI) where
(src.transaction.hash , dst.transaction.hash) →
(( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = CALL)) where
(dst.stack (2) > 0)
Parity Wallet
Hack 2
(opcode = CALLDATACOPY) { (opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = JUMPI) where
(src.transaction.hash , dst.transaction.hash) →
(( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = SELFDESTRUCT))
Integer Overow
(Addition)
(opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = ADD) where
((dst.stack (0) + dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Integer Overow
(Multiplication)
(opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = MUL) where
((dst.stack (0) * dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Integer Underow (opcode = CALLDATALOAD) { (opcode = SUB) where
((dst.stack (0) - dst.stack (1)) , dst.stack.result) { (opcode = CALL)
Timestamp
Dependence (opcode = TIMESTAMP) { (opcode = JUMPI) → (opcode = CALL) where (dst.stack (2) > 0)
Transaction
Order Dependency
(opcode = SSTORE) { (opcode = SLOAD) where
(src.block.number = dst.block.number) ∧ (src.transaction.from , dst.transaction.from)
Table 5: List of vulnerabilities and their respective attack patterns.
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